For these peacemaking efforts, the Democrat president was awarded a Nobel Prize in 1919. The Republican-dominated Senate’s refusal to be persuaded was more than just due to partisan politics; indeed, it reaffirmed an approach that had shaped American foreign policy for a century and a half.

On November 11, 1918 at 11:00 in the Compiègne Forest of Picardie, France, an armistice was signed, ending four years of fighting between the Allied forces and Germany/Austro-Hungary. It took another half year for the official Treaty of Versailles to be produced and another generation before European hostilities were finally ended. Largely because of its inter-European character, the United States was reluctant both to participate initially and, after having entered the War effort in 1917, to involve itself officially in this settlement.
America’s late entry into the War did not hinder its position as one of the more powerful victors, along with Britain, France and Italy, in leading and ultimately deciding peace terms. This ‘Big Four’, as it was known, met from January 1919 at the Paris Peace Conference in the staterooms at the Quai d’Orsay in Paris. The delegates had over 100 meetings before its cessation in June 1919.

Recognizing the probable role US would play in anticipated peace negotiations, Wilson devised and presented his Fourteen Points to the American Senate in early 1918. With a missionary-like zeal, he believed that world peace and prosperity could be ensured and sustained through the application of his principles. Relying on notions of progressivism that had underscored earlier reform in the US, these principles included the releasing of trade restrictions, maintaining openness and democracy, and supported political and economic self-determination for all nations. Wilson believed that the Fourteen Points afforded him a moral leadership among the Four. And, indeed, they initially formed the basis of the terms of the Treaty, underpinning the reconstruction of Europe as expressed in a proposed League of Nations that would safeguard world peace. Wilson’s support was threefold. He felt passionately that without support for the Treaty and League world peace could not be secured. Moreover, he believed that an elected body like the League could help solve world problems if through anything other than by validating the US’s leadership role in the decision-making process.
In spite of their propagandistic power, the Points were too contentious to form the basis of the terms of the Treaty. Britain and France had different reasons for not unanimously supporting them. The terms of the Treaty of Versailles, as agreed on 28 June 1919, however, only referred to four of Wilson’s fourteen points.

At home, Senate’s refusal to support the Treaty and League complicated. It was more than just a reaction to the peacemakers’ rejection of ten of Wilson’s Fourteen Points. Also, domestically, it was more than just the response of the Republican-dominated Senate to the grandiose schemes of a Democrat President. It is clear that arguments found root in the US’s historical position of isolationism.

Notably, Woodrow Wilson was the first president to break with this tradition and to align national interests with those of the world based on a set of new principles. In 1919, Senate firmly supported isolationism, feeling the League would encourage ‘unhealthy’ contacts that would lead inevitably to involvement in other world conflicts. These in turn could give Old World powers like Britain and France the power to control the American armed forces. Moreover, they feared the contaminating effect of European politics, increasingly that of Socialism. In the ensuing debate, four camps emerged: the Irreconcilables, the Mild Reservationists, the Reservationists and the Democratic Supporters. Of the more vociferous opponents were Henry Cabot Lodge and Alfred Beveridge. Lodge proposed a series of amendments to Wilson's bill ratifying American entry into the League that weakened its influence significantly.

Wilson refused to compromise with the Republican Senators, thus ensuring that Congress would never ratify American involvement in the League. Debate on the subject officially ended in March 1920 and Wilson died in 1924.
The United States’ refusal to ratify the Treaty of Versailles and to support the League of Nations was ultimately political, but its roots lay deep in American idealism that supported a messianic notion of purity of action while rejecting the defilement of contemporary European reality. Indeed, Wilson could not convince the governmental administration that there was any domestic benefit for from such involvement. However, by refusing to concede any of his points, he helped to draw the United States further inward. In the end, American non-involvement ensured the failure of the League of Nations and, perhaps, helped to precipitate an otherwise inevitable progress to war two decades later.