The monks wanted for the monkhood and Buddhism the power that they saw the Catholic Church and the Catholics have under Ngo Dinh Diem. They wanted to place their chosen Buddhist political laymen in the government, to be advisers to the government, and to gain more state patronage for Buddhism. Then they took more direct political action. With their social and political activities increasing through Buddhist organizations, they became more powerful and directed influence toward the government. They also developed tensions and even clashed with the Catholics who were afraid of being treated with the kind of religious discrimination that the Buddhists said they had suffered under the regime of Diem. When Nguyen Cao Ky established his military regime in June 2508/1965, there had taken place four more changes of South Vietnamese governments and the Buddhists were said to have been directly or indirectly responsible for the downfall of these governments.

In the early period of the Ky regime, the monks' overt political activities decreased due to unfavourable military and political conditions. Moreover, the split widened between the militant and the moderate monks. Under the urging of the lay Buddhists for political moderation and the building of internal strength, main efforts were directed towards more positive activities, especially Buddhist education, social welfare and youth programmes. Three weekly newspapers, three monthly magazines and twenty-five periodicals were published to achieve propagative aims.

Then, in March 2509/1966, the Buddhists came again into conflict with the government. The Unified Buddhist Church wanted to establish a position of power in the new government and brought political pressure on Premier Nguyen Cao Ky. They issued a communique on March 14, calling for (1) an immediate convention to draw up a constitution, (2) national elections, and (3) the return to his post of General Thi, a military leader popular among his men and the Buddhists, who had been dismissed from his position in Hue. This led to the Buddhist crisis which lasted until September 1966. In the process, the Buddhist movement was seriously divided between the moderates who sought to compromise and the militants who even turned their demands into a campaign to overthrow the Ky regime. In their internal struggle, it was the militants who defeated the moderates and dominated the actions of the Unified Buddhist Church.

The militant Buddhist students and thousands of soldiers in Hue and Danang followed the militant monks and brought the two cities to a point on the verge of rebellion. Violent protests were also held in Saigon. The government used force to put down the uprisings. As in the crisis of 1963, the Buddhists used demonstrations, hunger strikes and self-immolation as their weapons. But, this time, even their ultimate weapon of burning themselves to death did not excite the people and win popular acceptance so much as in the former crisis. The monks did not have a just cause. It was not a religious struggle to save the Buddhist Church, but a false cry without clarity of purpose. This time, it was not Ky but the militant Buddhists who were defeated. Hue and Danang were brought under government control and Ky had no need to resign.

However, though the Buddhists failed to remove Ky from power, lost the effectiveness and credibility of their leadership, and became weakened through their internal dissension, their efforts were not
altogether futile. Following pressure from them, the government was forced to hold elections for a national constituent assembly in September 2509/1966.