Iraq Study Group Proposes Diplomatic Offensive


by Don Sutherland - Date: 2006-12-11 - Word Count: 1276 Share This!

In its long-awaited report, the bipartisan Iraq Study Group (ISG) called for the United States to launch a "new diplomatic offensive" aimed at stabilizing Iraq "before December 31, 2006." The diplomatic offensive would involve all of Iraq's neighbors, including Iran and Syria, among other states. At this time, odds are against the various parties reaching a "grand bargain" on stabilizing Iraq anytime in the near-term. However, the ISG's recommendations constitute an important correction in U.S. foreign policy in its seeking to restore diplomacy to the forefront of the U.S. foreign policy arsenal. Ultimately, that correction could yield the largest payoff.

A number of factors suggest that the chances of reaching agreement on stabilizing Iraq, much less stabilizing it, in the near future are low. Larger Iranian and Syrian geopolitical interests might outweigh their interest in a stable Iraq. The large number of parties and wider range of regional interests could make it more difficult to reach agreement.

Iran and Syria are currently pursuing large-scale geopolitical ambitions. Both will remain highly opportunistic in those pursuits. Syria is seeking to regain its influence over Lebanon. It is seeking to gain all of the Golan Heights from Israel. If Lebanon is to remain fully sovereign, Syria will not be able to regain hegemony over Lebanon. If Syria is to regain much of the Golan Heights, it will need to reach a full peace agreement with Israel that accommodates the core needs of both states.

Iran is seeking to advance its nuclear enrichment and reprocessing program. It is also advocating the elimination of Israel. Allowing Iran to develop a nuclear weapons capability would have broad regional implications. Terrorist organizations affiliated with Iran's ideological revolution would benefit from their state sponsor's becoming a nuclear power. The regional Shia-Sunni schism now playing out in Iraq and, in part, in Lebanon, would almost surely lead to a nuclear arms race within the Middle East. A nuclear armed Iran would also have the potential to dominate the Gulf Region's oil producers and that would have substantial adverse implications at a time when the U.S. and international economies remain dependent on oil. Iran's desire to eliminate Israel is at odds with the United Nations Charter's provision that "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." If Iran were allowed to pursue that objective, aside from the resulting human toll, that precedent would shatter the core concept of state sovereignty that has been the foundation of international relations since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.

The ISG calls for the discussions to include all of Iraq's neighbors, all the major regional states except for Israel, the European Union and the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. At the same time, it asserts that "there must be a renewed and sustained commitment by the United States to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace on all fronts: Lebanon, Syria, and President Bush's June 2002 commitment to a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine." Yet, if the Middle East experience is representative, such an approach would actually increase the risks of failure in stabilizing Iraq.

The Egypt-Israel peace process succeeded precisely because it limited the number of participants and narrowed the focus of discussions to a bilateral peace. Early on, both Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin chose to conduct direct bilateral negotiations as opposed to an international conference or some other internationally-created approach. "Direct confrontation is the nearest and most successful method to reach a clear objective," Sadat told the Knesset in his historic November 1977 address that kicked off the start of the peace process. Sadat rejected the idea of a Geneva conference that would have brought a larger number of players and issues into the mix and thereby made the possibility of achieving peace more complex and more unlikely. In other words, the larger the number of parties and the larger the number of issues, the more likely it is that something could go wrong. Bringing the complex, difficult, and emotional Israel-Palestinian dispute into the equation would also provide Iran with a new vehicle by which it could advocate its anti-Semitic/anti-Israel policy.

If the diplomatic framework is to be successful, the objective will need to be narrowed to that of stabilizing Iraq. Up front, the U.S. will need to make it abundantly clear what it cannot do and why. It will need to let all parties know from the onset that it will not compromise the security of its allies or approve of Iran's becoming a nuclear power in exchange for a deal on Iraq. To the maximum extent possible, the talks would need to be bilateral and direct.

Beforehand, the U.S. would need to undertake rigorous preparation for such negotiations. An effort comparable to the "planning" undertaken prior to the Iraq War would be disastrous. The U.S. would also need to discard the notion that idealism alone should be sufficient to bring about agreement. In the context of international relations, idealism is largely worthless. Accommodation of critical interests and not the pursuit of ideals define the parameters and guide the tradeoffs from which effective agreements are achieved.

At this time, it is not certain that President Bush will embrace the idea of direct and unconditional negotiations with such parties as Iran. Considering the enormous role idealism has played in his Neoconservative foreign policy, it is likely that he will resist such an effort, insist on preconditions, or possibly counter with an alternative arrangement whereby the U.S. would not engage directly with Iran. Such an indirect approach would likely have a smaller prospect of success.

Moreover, if the U.S., not Iran, is seen as having refused direct negotiations, that could further turn world opinion against the U.S. Such a development would make it more difficult for the U.S. to build and sustain the international cooperation necessary to preclude Iran from developing nuclear weapons. However, if the U.S. agreed to such talks and Iran refused or it persisted in making unreasonable demands of the U.S., Iran would find itself increasingly isolated on the world stage. It could also experience the emergence of domestic political discontent from its having passed up the chance to change its standing in the world community.

Based on the ISG's "limited contacts with Iran's government," it is likely that Iran's leaders will decline to participate in such a diplomatic effort, though Iran's Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki hinted at some flexibility. In any case, a U.S. rejection that would preempt Iran's refusal to engage over Iraq, would only allow Iran to evade responsibility and the possible consequences of its own refusal to participate in the diplomatic process.

In the larger context, the ISG's report has initiated a process that could lead to the restoration of diplomacy as the centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy. In contrast to the Neoconservative hypothesis of a post-Cold War "Unipolar Moment" during which the U.S. would possess the freedom and power to act unilaterally, it has embraced the premise that the U.S. lacks the military and economic power to anchor its foreign policy in unilateralism. As a result, even beyond the Bush Administration's tenure, diplomacy not military power, is likely to regain prominence for creating a more secure world. In the long-run, just as credible diplomacy contributed to a successful outcome in the Cold War, the same kind of approach can allow the it to successfully overcome its ongoing ideological struggle with radical Islamist terrorism that confronts the U.S. and its allies. That, more than the outcome in Iraq, could well turn out to be the biggest payoff from the ISG's report.


Related Tags: israel, iraq, iraq study group, iran, james baker, lee hamilton, syria

Don Sutherland has researched and written on a wide range of geopolitical issues. Your Article Search Directory : Find in Articles

© The article above is copyrighted by it's author. You're allowed to distribute this work according to the Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivs license.
 

Recent articles in this category:



Most viewed articles in this category: